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have supposed that the Hague Conference of 1899 made a fiasco, namely, as regards a limitation of the armaments of the great nations, the simple fact is that Russia, in putting the subject forward as she did, omitted to make any adequate preliminary studies. Even to initiate such a discussion, a great mass of statistics, intricate mathematical calculations and a vast deal of close thinking will be requisite. The great committee to which the matter was referred did their best in the absence of such bases for discussion, but all in vain.

The United States will probably in any future conference, as in that of 1899, abstain from taking part in the discussion, since the limitation in the size of armies concerns Europe entirely and not ourselves, the American system requiring armaments on a scale much smaller than that usual in Europe.

Anglo-Franco-German Alliance — A Guarantee of Peace.

A Suggestion to Mr. Carnegie.

BY ROBERT STEIN.

"More and more," says Mr. Carnegie in his letter to the Boston Peace Congress, "my thoughts turn upon the next possible and necessary step forward to an agreement by certain powers to prevent appeals to war by civilized nations.

"Suppose, for instance, that Britain, France, Germany and America, with such other minor states as would certainly join them, were to take that position, prepared to enforce peaceful settlement, war would at one fell swoop be banished from the earth."

This is precisely the way in which the cause of peace has for the most part advanced. The devil was driven out by Beelzebub, chief of devils. Some one wielding the big stick found himself compelled by self-interest to keep the little fellows quiet. It was so with the famous *pax Romana*; it is so with the *pax Britannica* which reigns in India. Universal peace will most likely come about in the same way — by the predominance of one power. The valiant son of Count Tolstoy thinks (or thought) that this event is not far off. Let Russia absorb China and Persia, and the globe will enjoy a *pax Rossica*.

However, this would be paying rather dear for our whistle. Otto Ammon's classic work "Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen" is essentially an elaboration of the thesis that in a healthy society the control belongs by right to the cultured element. If humanity is to remain in a healthy condition, the cultured nations must be in control. This is Mr. Carnegie's idea. He would entrust the police force of the globe, not to the most despotic and least civilized, but to the freest, most enlightened and best-intentioned among the powers — those in whose hands the interests of humanity would be safest. To a *pax Rossica* he prefers a *pax Celto-Germanica*.

The press, commenting on his letter, pointed out that nations are not likely to unite solely for the somewhat idealistic purpose of enforcing peace, their only object being, as a rule, to add to their own security and power. Hence America need not at first be considered. She

feels no need of additional security or power, and hence will not enter into "entangling alliances."

But while America can afford to stand alone, neither Britain nor France nor Germany can afford to stand alone. Their solicitude about their future security and power is proved by the alliances which all three have contracted. Now in seeking the strength which comes from union, one would think that each nation would strive to unite with some nation most nearly like itself in culture, and pursuing most nearly the same ideals. If "birds of a feather flock together," if man is a "rational animal," it is really surprising that Britain, France and Germany have not been allied long ago, nay, that their present alliances are mainly designed to check each other, with the result of weakening the power of civilization and correspondingly increasing the power of barbarism. This is enough to make every civilized angel weep. The names of these three nations are so constantly pronounced together, as synonymous with "the civilized world," that they might as well be hyphenated. There have been many triple alliances less well sorted. The era of unrestricted competition is everywhere passing into the era of trusts. What more natural than that the three keenest competitors for power, each claiming to be the champion of civilization, should form a *Trust of Civilization*, enjoying a monopoly of power and an absolute guarantee of security! Instead of checking, they would then have every reason to promote each other's growth. The smaller nations of Europe would instantly reinforce the alliance of the Three Great Free and Cultured Nations, not indeed as formal members of it — for the alliance could hardly be more than triple without becoming unwieldy — but yet virtually, by their mere existence. In brief, the Federation of Free Europe is assured the moment a nucleus of sufficient attraction is created, and no other nucleus seems conceivable than the Trinity of Germany, Britain and France. So closely akin are these three elements that their fusion would at once be recognized as indissoluble. And from such an alliance the United States would not long hold aloof.

GERMANY MUST TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

Germany, having most cause to be solicitous about the future, ought to be most interested in an arrangement which would make it profitable for Britain and France to favor, instead of checking her expansion. Her present oversea domain of a little more than a million square miles being practically unfit for white settlement, her surplus population will continue to pour into foreign lands, constantly weakening the mother country, constantly reinforcing her competitors. The result must be her gradual descent to the rank of a minor power. She feels, therefore, that all interests must be subordinated to the paramount necessity of acquiring colonies of settlement without delay, and if she can acquire them only through alliance with Britain and France, it is reasonable to suppose that she will be willing to make almost any sacrifice in order to gain that alliance.

Now unless Germany intends to annex the moon or to dry up part of the ocean bed, there are only two regions left for colonization: (1) Mesopotamia, (2) Mongolia and East Turkestan. The latter region is outside the scope of this paper. Mesopotamia, on the other hand, is ripe for discussion, because Germany's thoughts are clearly

July,

bent in that direction, and because of the chronic Armenian atrocity. If the peculiar government at Constantinople is to be prevented from executing its plan to end the Armenian question by exterminating the Armenians, if the chronic warfare between that government and its subjects is to be stopped, it can only be by making the task *profitable* to one or more powers. The year in which Germany receives the assurance that it is safe for her to occupy Syria and Mesopotamia, that year will be the last of Turkish rule.

RECONCILIATION WITH FRANCE A LIFE NECESSITY TO GERMANY.

Now Germany cannot get an inch of Syria or Mesopotamia so long as Russia can prevent it, for Russia has long considered them as her own heritage. And Russia can prevent it so long as France remains her ally. In other words, France, without firing a gun, simply by her silent support of Russia, can condemn Germany to slow degradation from the rank of a great power. And France can hardly do otherwise, for she would render herself ridiculous if she helped Germany to get colonies so long as Germany makes no concession to her. Nothing is more admired than the theory "Return good for evil"; none are more despised than those who practice it. The conclusion is evident. If Germany wishes to remain a great power she must reconcile France by an adequate concession.

This would at once reverse the situation. The conscience of France is perpetually troubled, her pride humbled, to think that a government so diametrically opposed to her own, a government which strangles freedom in Poland, Lithuania and Finland, which incites massacres in its own land, which deliberately prevents the enlightenment of its own people, which declares that Armenia must be kept in a state of chronic atrocity, lest it become "a second Bulgaria," that is to say, lest it cease to afford a standing pretext for annexation, derives its power mainly from the support of a republic which stands for liberty, equality, fraternity. The Dual Alliance would vanish with its cause, the quarrel between France and Germany. Once reconciled, the two countries would be driven into alliance by their common desire to escape from their Russian vassalage. They could profit far more by coöperating with Britain than by opposing her, and Britain would be almost compelled to join them, for a counter alliance would be out of the question. A friendly Germany would be welcomed by Britain in Mesopotamia as the best possible bulwark against Russia, for Germany could maintain herself there only through Britain's support and would thus be compelled to remain her firm ally. The Trust of Civilization (*Kulturbund*, as the Germans would call it) seems in fact conceivable only on condition that the three powers eliminate beforehand, so far as possible, all subjects of discord, by dividing Turkey among themselves into spheres of interest, and pledging the whole power of the alliance to maintain these spheres, as well as the present possessions of each. Nations always demand immediate and tangible results.

THE KEY TO ALL LIES IN ALSACE-LORRAINE.

At this point some good German patriots and lovers of peace will whisper: "For Heaven's sake, don't men-

tion Alsace-Lorraine! Keep quiet about it for a few years and the French will forget it!"

Forget it! Forget the most recent and most terrible event in their history, with a thousand reminders of it perpetually in sight; with souvenirs of *l'année terrible* in every cottage? What sort of men do you suppose the French to be?

The briefest inquiry suffices to show that, unless French sentiment on the Alsace-Lorraine question is satisfied, it is useless at present to talk of a Franco-German alliance. This means that Germany will never have colonies, for in twenty-five years the remaining colonizable lands will have their final masters. In brief, if Germany wishes to remain a great power, she must consent to a compromise on the Alsace-Lorraine question.

The French have defined the nature of that compromise with their accustomed clearness. "We cannot abandon the Alsace-Lorrainers so long as they are French at heart. Let them be allowed to determine their own nationality."

To this Germany would of course have no reason to object if she were sure that the verdict would turn out in her favor. This is not improbable. Alsace-Lorraine has been more prosperous, economically, under German than under French rule, and hearts are largely moved by the pocketbook. The Dreyfus scandal, the anti-clerical measures, the expulsion of an Alsatian priest from France as a "foreigner," have largely estranged the Alsace-Lorrainers from France. Meantime the Kaiser neglects no opportunity to befriend the Church. The Alsatian Catholics would have to be blind if they turned from a pro-clerical to an anti-clerical government; and the Protestants are German in their sympathies almost to a man. A distinguished Alsatian assures the writer that in his village hardly a man would vote for France. The very fact that the legislature is all the time clamoring for autonomy proves that it has no thought of breaking away from Germany. A bill, with which the name of Deputy Spahn is immortally associated, was recently introduced in the Reichstag, by a group of Centrists, aiming to give to Alsace-Lorraine representation in the Bundesrat. This indicates that the most powerful party in the Reichstag, the Catholics, more patriotic and enlightened than some of their revilers, are preparing to take the few remaining steps to give to Alsace-Lorraine perfect equality with the other German states, with an autonomous parliament and a prince of its own. Judging by Von Bülow's reply, the Kaiser seems to be not unwilling to grant this demand. If this were done, the autonomous parliament would probably of its own accord vote for perpetual union with Germany. Being thus precluded, by her own principles, from maintaining any further claims, would France be ready for an alliance?


FRENCH-SPEAKING DISTRICTS TO BE RESTORED TO FRANCE.

One more obstacle would remain. In the Philadelphia Peacemaker, February, 1890, the present writer pointed out that a portion of Alsace-Lorraine is French in language; that, so long as this remains under German rule, ill-feeling must continue; while its restitution would almost certainly accomplish the reconciliation. He returned to the subject, under the signature "Pan-Aryan," in the Review of Reviews, December, 1894, and in the Arena,

January, 1897. He discussed it again in the Anglo-American Magazine, April, 1899, in the Washington Post, January 17, 1904, the Washington Times, February 28, 1904, and in L'Européen, June 30, 1904. The same idea was expressed by "Vir Pacificus" in the Preussische Jahrbücher, January, 1896, by Dr. Heinrich Molenaar in L'Etranger (now Concordia) in 1898, and, in December, 1898, by Jules Lemaitre, who stated (in the Echo de Paris) that this proposition had been made to the French government by a German diplomat during the reign of Emperor Frederick. Dr. Molenaar has since founded the Franco-German League (Deutsch-französische Liga, 5 Holzkirchnerstrasse, Munich) which aims to discuss this and other means of reconciliation. Its purposes were set forth by Dr. Molenaar in L'Européen, November 19, 1904, and in a lecture at Munich on January 22, 1905, since published in pamphlet form. General A. von der Lippe ("Andere Zeiten, andere Wege," Berlin, Otto Salle, 1904), speaking of this League, says that

the restitution of Metz is out of the question now, but that the prospect of an alliance with France would change the situation completely. In Le Figaro, May 10, 1905, General von der Lippe proposes a Franco-German commercial alliance, and, in return for it, the restitution of Lorraine. Prof. Hans Delbrück, of the University of Berlin, member of the Reichstag and editor of the Preussische Jahrbücher, says (May, 1904): "The sacrifice (whereby to conciliate France and gain a colonial empire) has been discussed often enough: the restitution of Metz. In itself, especially if combined with the acquisition of Luxembourg, this would have been no serious sacrifice." Another distinguished university professor writes: "If the French are willing to be our allies, they can not only have Metz, but with us rule the world." Baron Rothschild used to say that the secret of getting rich lies in knowing how to spend money at the right moment. Metz is the coin which can buy a colonial empire for Germany, and now is the time to spend it. Five years hence it may be too late, and Germany may have to remain land-poor forever.

The accompanying map shows the distribution of languages in Alsace-Lorraine. The writer will never forget the feeling of shame and horror that came over him when he first saw this map in Petermann's Mitteilungen (1875, plate 17). Till then he had believed that all Alsace-Lorraine spoke German. The "âme" or "cœur," which are said to determine nationality, are, after all, but pretty substitutes for the homely word "habit," and habit is driven out by habit. A few years, he thought, would suffice to make the Alsace-Lorrainers feel that they had never been anything else than Germans; a few more years of reflection would convince the French that their occupation of a German-speaking territory had all along been a mutilation of Germany, a moral crime. The discovery that a broad French-speaking belt had been included in the annexation of 1871 came like a thunderbolt. We had committed the very crime of which we accused the French. At first glance no other motive seemed conceivable than a desire to lord it over a slice of *la grande nation* — a motive so base that, if it were proved to have existed, every decent German would be compelled to disown his nation till the outrage was redressed. He felt relieved on learning, soon after, that no such motive had ever existed. Bismarck, the sober, matter-of-fact statesman, had all along intended to draw the new frontier *along the language boundary*, and for this he pleaded in the peace negotiations. Moltke, however,



insisted that Metz was worth an army of one hundred thousand, and Bismarck regretfully yielded. For purely military reasons, therefore, Metz and vicinity were annexed. These reasons remained valid so long as no alliance with France was possible, and meantime a certain subservience to Russia was a disagreeable necessity. But if an escape from this subservience be now afforded through a French alliance, a pro-Russian policy on the part of Germany becomes suicidal, and the retention of the French-speaking belt becomes an outrage. Constituting an insuperable obstacle to the alliance which is the only avenue to Germany's continuance as a great power, it is penny-wise and pound-foolish, and whoever should insist on it would become a traitor. Moreover, no amount of autonomy will convert the French-speaking inhabitants into German patriots.

There is reason to think that Bismarck, in consenting to the annexation of Metz, had in mind the advantage which might some day be gained from its restitution. The French will naturally hold out for the biggest price for their alliance, but there is little doubt that the recovery of all the French-speaking territory would placate them, and that they would be willing to give a good-sized colony in exchange. If at the same time the German-speaking district expressed its desire to remain with Germany, it seems inconceivable what further concessions a reasonable Frenchman could demand. The individual relations between the two nations are so cordial, the advantages of coöperation in Turkey and elsewhere so tempting, that only one result seems possible: a prompt alliance—the prelude to the *Kulturbund*.

The Alsace-Lorrainers could then regard themselves, in a manner, as citizens of both nations. The proud distinction of having forged the first and indispensable link in the League of Civilization, of having been literally the bestowers of the incomparable gift of universal peace, would of course be a potent means to render them contented. Through all the centuries to come, Alsace-Lorraine would be known the world over as the Holy Land of Peace.

Ask any intelligent man's opinion on the proposed alliance of the three most civilized nations of Europe, and he will reply: "Of course, that is the way it ought to be." Be manly enough, then, to speak out and insist that it shall be so.

A MEANS TO START THE DISCUSSION.

If Mr. Carnegie's plan of a League of Civilization to enforce peace is to bear fruit, it will have to be discussed in the press of the three countries. The originator of the idea has the means to start the discussion.

Suppose Mr. Carnegie were to promise that, in case the Anglo-Franco-German Alliance were realized within a stated period, he would donate to the universities of London, Paris and Berlin \$10,000,000 each, to establish in each of these cities a Carnegie Institution like the one in Washington,—the world's peace is surely worth \$30,000,000, the price of five battleships,—what would be the result?

It is not to be expected that the three governments would telegraph next day their grateful acceptance of the gift, and their willingness to fulfill the stipulated condition. The first comment would surely be a sneer, for that is easiest. To expect that objections based on real national interests would be overcome by the bait of

\$30,000,000 would of course be absurd. But the promise of that sum would certainly rise to a widespread and keen study of the situation, which might show whether the obstacles consist of solid irreconcilable interests or of mere ill-temper and myopia. The learned public in the three countries would be in the condition of Tantalus. Already the demands on the one existing Carnegie Institution exceed its resources fourfold.

All over Europe, especially in Germany, thousands of learned men walk about with manuscripts and plans in their pockets, seeking publishers and patrons and finding none. The leaders of research, the custodians of funds, are anxious to set these armies of involuntary idlers to work at once, because much of the material of research is in danger of passing away. Were it known that a vast fund for research is available as soon as a certain condition is fulfilled, is it not certain that the condition would be subjected to constant scrutiny and discussion by a great number of highly intelligent and influential people? Would not the IF be the nightly pillow of every impecunious savant? Would he not be urged by a torturing motive to ascertain the exact value of the objections? And if the objections proved unsubstantial (and nature would be perverse indeed if she had decreed the interests of the highest types of mankind to be irreconcilable), is it not certain that a constant pressure would be exerted on public opinion? The Franco-German League would soon number not hundreds but thousands of members. The Anglo-Franco-German Alliance is in the air. According to the Berliner Morgenpost (quoted by L'Europe Nouvelle, September, 1904) it was discussed at Kiel by Kaiser and King. M. Gaston Vacher de Lapouge, the distinguished anthropologist, even advocates (L'Européen, June 30, 1904) a France-Germany, under the Kaiser's sovereignty, after the fashion of Austria-Hungary, practically restoring the empire of Charlemagne. The German press is still echoing the enthusiastic welcome which it extended to Sir Thomas Barclay on his recent tour, intended to initiate between Britain and Germany the same movement toward a better understanding which was so successful in the case of Britain and France. From their graves, Cecil Rhodes and Mommsen perpetually plead for such an understanding between mother and daughter. Surely the instinct which produced the "historic alliance" has not decayed; it has merely been somewhat deafened by the clamor of the light-weights. Just now the German press is applauding the formation of the Anglo-German Union in London, under the presidency of Lord Lonsdale, and is urging the formation of a similar Union in Berlin.

Just now the French and German press is ringing with alarm at the "Yellow Peril," which in Britain and America is largely treated as a bogey. Bogey or no bogey, the peril will vanish the moment France and Germany clasp hands, because their union, as has been explained, will necessarily lead to the Triple Alliance. Germany, who sounded the alarm at the peril, will surely not brand herself for all time to come as the traitor nation, who, with the boast of Aryan superiority and the cry for Aryan unity perpetually on her lips, destroyed the Aryan supremacy and placed the white race at the mercy of the yellow by refusing, at the critical moment, to fulfill the indispensable, self-evident condition to Aryan unity—to restore to France a bit of French earth in

exchange for an alliance, which, without this act of justice and the mutual confidence thereby engendered, would be futile and impossible, since it would mean a mortal humiliation for France, while to Germany the proposed concession would bring not only no humiliation, but worldwide honor and applause. In brief, let discussion be secured and the result will not long remain in doubt.

Among all Mr. Carnegie's benefactions, none could compare with this in grandeur and fruitfulness. The author of the League of Civilization, which is to control the destinies of mankind for their highest good, would fill a place in history such as no king or conqueror ever dreamt of. The immediate object of the gift, of priceless value in itself, would be merely the seed of an incomparably greater blessing. It would be an investment transcending all known forms of dividends; an antidote to the remnant of resentment against Britain, still lingering on the Continent; a graceful acknowledgment of America's debt to Britain, France and Germany, for colonists sent to develop her resources and for training given to American scholars. By conciliating the German-Americans, it would tend to remove one of the most serious obstacles to the reunion of Britain with her lost colonies. The same munificence that endowed the Hague Court with a home would give it life by placing an executive power behind it. The cosmopolitan, peace-making influence of science would be most happily emphasized. The three Carnegie institutions, in the three foci of civilization, standing as the foremost agencies of research, would also stand forever as the Three Peace Monuments.

The Arrest and Reduction of Armaments an Urgent Necessity.

Address of Mr. d'Estournelles de Constant in the French Senate on the 11th of April, when the Navy Budget was under consideration.

(COMPLETED FROM LAST ISSUE.)

Thus, in order to increase our unproductive expenses, we cannot count on the increase of our population and of our economic resources. Nor can we count upon new taxes, the limit of the power of the taxpayers being already reached, our margin being already exhausted, to use the expression of Mr. Ribot. Nor can we count upon a reform of our fiscal system, since the duty laid upon revenue should be dictated by justice and not by the necessity of more funds. On this we are all agreed.

Consequently, in increasing our naval expenses we are inevitably increasing the burdens of our children. We give ourselves the conceited satisfaction of the expense, and we leave them the debt, and, still worse, the trouble of managing the accounts. While we impoverish them, we reduce their strength for the future. Under the pretense of organizing the present national defense in a large way, we render it impossible in the future. We are failing in the most sacred of our duties,—we are deceiving the generations who are expecting from our hand the torch of progress. Let us aid them rather to simplify their task. Let us, gentlemen, give our children a lesson more virile, more worthy of France. Let us prepare them to sacrifice their life with joy, if necessary, for just causes, for the defense of liberty and of their inalienable rights. But let us not, without their knowledge, involve them in inextricable difficulties.

Let us not impose upon thirty-eight millions of Frenchmen the illusion of believing France still face to face, as a century ago, with a single great naval power which, furthermore, gave her, singlehanded, enough, nay, too much embarrassment; whereas, round about us, round about Europe itself, all is changed, since our own generation is already at grips with neighbors which did not then exist, with a competition which did not then exist; with rival markets in America, in Asia, which recently were our clients. . . . [Cries of "Very good! Very good!"]

Such as she is, France is indeed great. In spite of everything, in spite of her disasters, in spite of the obstacles raised against her in the midst of armed monarchical Europe, republican France has lost none of her authority. She has rather increased it. At present, when she is becoming a guarantee of order and of peace, everybody sets store by her existence. Let us ourselves do her justice. Let us allow her to pursue her recuperative evolution. Let us not ask too much of her strength. The more prodigal she has been of her gold and her blood, the more culpable it is to exhaust her without cause. And to keep forever before her this mirage of maritime domination is to exhaust her. To entice her with this grand word, "the empire of the sea," is to exhaust her and to mock her. Master of the sea is a fine romantic term. In reality there is no more any empire of the sea than there is of the world. There is an empire of seas. But this empire will not be henceforth the appanage of one only; it will belong not to one people, but to the association of peoples. Let us prepare this association. . . .

M. Le Cour Grandmaison: That kind of syndicates are no good.

M. d'Estournelles de Constant: That is the remedy. That is the beneficent organization which France alone can bring about. That is the incomparable mission which she can assume and bequeath to her children, a mission of a different order of usefulness and grandeur than that of the fatal schemes of ostentation set before us.

But in this matter I know that I am exposing myself to many sarcasms. I do not confine myself to calling attention to the evil. Fruitless lamentations are repulsive to me. Like Mr. Antonin Dubot, I venture to suggest a solution. Others will offer their criticisms. My rôle is to provoke them, until the time comes when we shall finally leave the dead point which now holds us.

My argument is in no wise sentimental. I say simply that since the embarrassment of our neighbors is the same or worse than our own, there might be, there ought to be an understanding. An international agreement, not to reduce naval expenses but to cease to augment them, still appears to be a chimera. But it was the same a few years ago with other proposed international agreements. And yet these agreements, already realized to the general satisfaction, have already become insufficient.

M. Dominique Delahaye: General! that is indeed to generalize!

M. d'Estournelles de Constant: International legislation controls artistic, literary and industrial property, hygiene, justice, transportation, postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications, while waiting for wireless